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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
ERLENE KAY STRIEBY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 900201 
Category No. 13 
OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing 
respondent's manslaughter conviction, which accepted the District 
Court's credibility findings and utilized and applied the proper 
standard of review for a bench trial, is an appropriate case for an 
exercise of this Court's supervisory power. See Utah R. App. P. 46. 
REPORT OF OPINION 
The subject decision has been reported in 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 
81 (Utah Ct. App., March 30, 1990); slip op. No. 8901240-CA. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing respondent's 
conviction for manslaughter was entered on March 30, 1990. No 
rehearing was ordered. This Court has jurisdiction to review the 
decision by a writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann.f 
§ 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1989), § 78-2a-4 (1986). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Appendix). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 30, 1988, respondent was found guilty by the 
District Court, sitting without a juryf of manslaughter. Respon-
dent was also found not guilty of second degree murder. On January 
9, 1989f the District Court sentenced her to a term of imprisonment 
of not less than one year, nor more than 15 years. The District 
Court further ordered her to pay restitution to the decedent's 
family (her in-laws) in an amount to be set by the Board of Pardons 
at the time of release. On January 18, 1989, respondent filed a 
motion for a new trial, supported by an affidavit, based on certain 
findings made by the District Court at the time it rendered its 
verdict. On February 8, 1989, the District Court denied respon-
dent's motion for a new trial. On appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the conviction was reversed. State v. Strieby, 131 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 81 (Utah Ct. App. March 30, 1990); slip op. No. 890124-
CA.3/ 
- In light of its disposition, the Court of Appeals did not 
need to decide whether the District Court erroneously denied respon-
dent's motion for a new trial or improperly ordered restitution. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of July 8, 1988f in Tooele County, Ms. Sandy 
Magana heard someone crying, looked out the window of her condo-
minium and saw Kay Strieby, the respondent herein, sobbing 
hysterically. Mrs. Strieby came to Ms. Magana's door and asked her 
to call the paramedics because Chris Strieby, the decedent, had 
been shot. Mrs. Strieby told Ms. Magana that she shot the decedent 
because he was beating her and would not stop but "just kept 
coming." (R. 136 at 126-132). Ms. Magana called the police at 
approximately 6:38 p.m. 
Officers from the Tooele County Sheriff's office promptly 
arrived on the scene and noted that Mrs. Strieby was extremely 
upset, had a swollen eye, a swollen lip and a mark on her forehead. 
(R. 136 at 38-42). 
Detective Alan James and Sheriff Don Proctor took a taped 
statement from Mrs. Strieby following the shooting as she sat in 
the sheriff's car at the scene (hereinafter cited as State's 
Exhibit (St. Ex.) #14). Mrs. Strieby told Detective James and 
Sheriff Proctor that she and the decedent had been arguing since 
the previous day. On the morning of July 8, she got up early in 
order to be at work in Grantsville by 6:00 a.m. After work, she 
went home, did some housework and then went to the Strieby welding 
shop in Tooele to talk with the decedent. They arguedf and the 
decedent told Mrs. Strieby she "was a cunt and not to come around 
him anymore ...". He gave her the "finger," and she left and drove 
-3-
to the Eagle's, a private club in Tooele, where she talked with 
friends and had a few drinks. She then returned to the Strieby 
welding trailer to pick up the decedent. She and the decedent 
argued again and the argument ended with him knocking her down. 
Mrs. Strieby then called a friend who came and took her home. (St. 
Ex. #14 at 2, 7-8). 
Don McCord, the decedent's best friend, was at Strieby Welding 
drinking with the decedent on the day in question. Mr. McCord 
testified that he and the decedent had been drinking all day and 
that the decedent had already drunk approximately two-thirds of a 
fifth of vodka when Mrs. Strieby returned to the trailer that 
afternoon. By that time, he and the decedent were drinking from a 
fresh half gallon of vodka. After Mrs. Strieby left, McCord and 
the decedent continued to drink their half gallon. (R. 136 at 
68-71, 81-85). 
When Mrs. Strieby got home, she lay down to rest for a few 
minutes. When the decedent's nephew and his friend, both of whom 
were staying at the Striebys1, came home, Mrs. Strieby asked them 
to drive to the trailer and bring the decedent home "before he 
gets too drunk." (St. Ex. #14 at 2). The boys went to the trailer 
and found the decedent still drinking. They persuaded him to go 
with them and dropped him off outside the condominium shortly after 
6:25 p.m. without going inside. (R. 136 at 107-113). 
As soon as the boys left, the decedent entered the condominium 
and immediately began yelling obscenities at Mrs. Strieby while 
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grabbing her and threatening to kill her. As Mrs. Strieby told 
Detective James: 
I opened the door and the kids left and he 
just, just started hitting me and started 
calling me names and saying I did things I 
didn't [Hie said, "I'll kill ya.n He 
said, "I'll beat you to death. No wonder 
your first husband beat you. You're a mouthy 
bitch." 
Mrs. Strieby repeatedly pleaded with the decedent to leave her 
alone, and also asked him to give her a few days and she would move 
out. But he refused: 
[Hie said, "I ain't giving you no time at 
all." ... I said, "Chris you can't be like 
this," and he said he'd kill me, he'd beat me 
to death. He said, "If the beatin' you 
thought you got at dad's trailer was bad 
today, you wait until I get ahold of you 
again." 
(St. Ex. #14 at 3-4, 8). 
Mrs. Strieby pulled away from the decedent's grasp and ran 
away from him up the stairs. The decedent grabbed Mrs. Strieby by 
the leg and dragged her down the stairs on her back and neck. Mrs. 
Strieby again asked the decedent, "please ... just leave me alone, I 
just, give me a couple a days," but the decedent was "grabbing" and 
"shaking" her, so she struggled free and ran upstairs. (St. Ex. 
#14 at 4; R. 136 at 163). Although Mrs. Strieby was too shaken to 
recall exactly how she got the decedent's gun from their bedroom 
closet, she had it when he charged at her up the stairs. She 
begged him to quit beating her, but the decedent kept coming: 
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He said.... "I'll kill you before you can 
pull the trigger." He told me to go in and 
pull the trigger. He could knock me down 
four times before I could pull the trigger. 
There wasn't enough dust to bury him.... 
(St. Ex. #14 at 4, 8). Mrs. Strieby again pleaded with the 
decedent not to hit her again. He told her to "Pull the trigger 
you fucking bitch, cause it ain't loaded and I can make it up the 
stairs before you pull it anyway." (St. Ex. #14 at 8). As the 
decedent came charging up the second flight of stairs from the 
landingf he again told her that he was going to kill herf and she 
fired one shot which killed him. Mrs. Strieby recalled on the 
scene that "I don't really remember pulling the trigger, God 
Almighty. It hurt my arm, it threw my arm clear back and I am so, 
oh God Almighty ... it was horrible. It was terrible. I, oh my 
neck is sore, my back is sore. He really whopped me a good one in 
the neck and my neck is really sore but I didn't mean to hurt 
him...." (St. Ex. #14 at 5, 8). After her arrest, Mrs. Strieby 
was taken to the emergency room at the local hospital for treatment 
for the neck and back injuries sustained during the beating. 
Dr. Edward Sweeney, the state medical examiner who examined 
the body, testified that the decedent was a "heavyset man" weigh-
ing about 200 pounds with a "muscular development." The 
decedent's alcohol level was .25 milligrams percent, or approxi-
mately three times the legal limit for the State of Utah. Dr. 
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Sweeney testified that alcohol affects the highest levels first -
those "that separate man from animal." Dr. Sweeney also testified 
that the decedent's self-control and judgment would clearly have 
been affected at his .25 blood alcohol content.- (R. 136 at 117-
121) . 
Mrs. Strieby testified in her own defense and elaborated on 
and expanded her voluntary statement to Detective James and Sheriff 
Proctor. Her trial testimony was consistent with her earlier 
statement at the scene, and the trial judge found it to be 
credible. (R. 135 at 4). Mrs. Strieby testified that in April of 
1988, after having known each other for several years and having 
previously lived togetherf Mrs. Strieby and the decedent were 
married. At the time of the marriage, the decedent was estranged 
from and had no contact with his father and brothers. A few months 
later, however, he had begun spending time with his family again. 
Since that time and in the two months immediately prior to July 8, 
-The State erroneously asserts that, based on the decedent's 
blood alcohol content, his ability to move was "obviously" impaired. 
State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, n.l. The clear 
weight of the evidence does not support this assertion. Indeed, as 
the Court of Appeals correctly stated, "tt]here is little, if any, 
evidence in the record to support the trial judge's conclusion that 
Chris's coordination was impaired by alcohol to the extent that he 
was not a serious threat to defendant.... [Dr. Sweeny] testified 
that a .25 blood alcohol content would strongly affect self-control 
and judgment, and might affect coordination, but to a lesser 
extent.... [Defendant's actual injuries illustrate that Chris was 
fully capable of seriously harming defendant." State v. Strieby, 
131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83. 
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the decedent had become emotionally upset due to problems with his 
family. He began drinking excessively and became very short-
tempered. (R. 137 at 218-226). 
On July 7, 1988, the decedent was angry because he had not had 
sex for some time, and he blamed Mrs. Strieby. He told her that if 
he did not get sex from her soon he would "go someplace else for 
it." Mrs. Strieby told him that his excessive drinking was the 
cause of the problem since he was unable to maintain an erection 
when drunk. She told the decedent that if he drank less they 
probably could have sex. Mrs. Strieby then went upstairs to bed. 
Approximately twenty minutes later, the decedent followed her 
upstairs, slapped her in the face with his penis and demanded sex. 
Mrs. Strieby asked him to leave her alone. The decedent then 
"jumped on" Mrs. Strieby and attempted to have intercourse with her 
"from behind". The decedent eventually went downstairs and slept 
on the couch. (R. 136 at 229-230). 
The following evening when the decedent was brought home by 
his nephew, he immediately attacked Mrs. Strieby. The decedent was 
substantially bigger and stronger than Mrs. Strieby. Although they 
had argued in the past, he had never before attacked her as he did 
that night. He had also never before threatened to kill her. 
Mrs. Strieby testified that "the door flew open" and the attack 
began. He began beating her and calling her names. When Mrs. 
Strieby asked for some time in order to leave, he told her she 
"didn't have any time." Although she tried to open and escape 
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through the front door, the decedent slammed it shut. He told her 
that "two other women had left him, and the only way [she] could 
leave was on a stretcher." (R. 136 at 240-241). 
As she tried to protect herself from the decedent's attack in 
the entryway, Mrs. Strieby ran up the stairs to the landing. The 
decedent grabbed her and pulled her back down the stairs by her 
leg. As she was pulled down the steps, her head hit the landing 
and stairs. Mrs. Strieby had broken her back before and had a long 
history of serious back injuries, including four prior back 
surgeries. The decedent was aware of her prior surgeries and back 
problems. To protect herself, she said she "put my hands up and 
tried to double my body up so I would — I was scared because of my 
back, and I was scared because of my head. I didn't know if I had 
hurt my head bad. He just wouldn't leave me alone." (R. 137 at 
241-244). 
Throughout the attack, the decedent told Mrs. Strieby that he 
was going to kill her. She testified: 
I had never seen him like this. I had never 
seen his eyes — I had never seen his face 
contorted to the point where he was 
completely uncontrollable, where he — I 
couldn't talk to him. He just kept saying, 
"I am going to kill you, you bitch. I am 
going to kill you, you bitch. You don't 
deserve to live." And he just — he wouldn't 
stop.... But all this time he was telling me 
he was going to kill me. And he told me — 
just screaming things at me. Just screaming 
... He was screaming obscenities, and things 
that — sometimes he didn't even make sense. 
I was scared by then. So scared of him I 
knew that he was going to kill me. And he 
said he was going to kill me. 
(R. 137 at 242-243). 
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As the decedent struck out at Mrs. Strieby, she pushed him in 
the direction of the kitchen and ran up the stairs again. Mrs. 
Strieby could hear the decedent yelling at her, but did not know if 
he was in the kitchen or on his way up the stairs. (R. 137 at 
245). He told her "I'm going to kill you, you bitch. You've just 
embarrassed me enough, and I am going to kill you." Mrs. Strieby 
testified that "he just — he kept coming up the stairs. He just 
kept coming. And he kept screaming at me that he could get me 
before I could shoot him...." As the decedent continued up the 
stairs in pursuit of her, Mrs. Strieby fired one shot from his gun, 
killing him. (R. 137 at 245-246). 
Mrs. Strieby was taken to the Tooele Valley Hospital emergency 
room where she was examined by Dr. Mark Anderson for her neck pain 
and other injuries. At trial, Dr. Anderson testified that based on 
Mrs. Strieby's pain and the numbness in her hands, he thought that 
Mrs. Strieby had suffered either a broken neck or a ruptured 
cervical disk. Dr. Anderson stated that four prior back surgeries 
for one individual is "extremely unusual" and that Mrs. Strieby's 
range of motion in her back and neck was generally less than half 
that of normal. In addition, Dr. Anderson testified that Mrs. 
Strieby had bruises on various parts of her body, including bruises 
that were in the shape of fingers, "a classic description of some-
body being grabbed with the fingers very hard." She also had 
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multiple abrasions, a swollen left eye and a tender area on her 
neck. (R. 137 at 194-201). 
Dr. Anderson also testified that Mrs. Strieby's injuries were 
consistent with being dragged down stairs on her neck and back and 
with trying to escape an attack. Dr. Anderson further stated that 
being dragged down stairs on one's neck and back could certainly 
cause death or serious bodily injury. In fact, Dr. Anderson stated 
that because of Mrs. Strieby's back problems and prior surgeries, 
serious bodily injury was more likely for her. For someone in her 
condition, Dr. Anderson testified, being dragged down the stairs 
could have caused her paralysis or death. (R. 137 at 203-204). 
At the conclusion of the case, the District Court found 
respondent guilty of manslaughter. However, in rendering its 
verdict, the District Court stated that it had "no substantial 
reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version." (R. 135 at 4). In fact, 
the District Court specifically found that the decedent had resumed 
beating Mrs. Strieby upon arriving home and further indicated that 
it had "no substantial doubt about the reality" of her fear for her 
life, given the decedent's "powerful muscular build." (R. 135 at 
6). The Court of Appeals adopted and accepted the District Court's 
credibility findings. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, 
that the District Court's verdict was against the clear weight of 
evidence. State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83. 
ARGUMENT 
A. A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. 
There are no "special and important reasons" for this Court to 
exercise its judicial discretion to review the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in this case. See Utah R. App. P. 46. This case 
does not involve (1) a decision by a panel of the Court of Appeals 
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue; (2) a decision on a question of state or 
federal law in conflict with a decision of this Court; (3) a 
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision; or, (4) an important question of 
municipal, state or federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court, Ici. 
Most importantly, this case does not involve, as the State 
erroneously suggests in its petition, a case where the Court of 
Appeals made a credibility determination in conflict with the trier 
of fact. In that regard, Sweeney Land Company v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 
760 (Utah 1990), cited by the State, does not support its position. 
In that case, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals which had 
made a determination of a witness' credibility in direct conflict 
with that of the trial court. As this Court noted, "[t]he trial 
court's determination regarding [the witness'] credibility was 
exactly the type of determination that rule 52(a) is meant to 
protect on appeal." Ij3. at 761. In the present case, the trial 
court made an express finding that it had "no substantial reason 
to doubt Mrs. Striebyfs version" and that given the decendent's 
"powerful muscular build" there was "no substantial doubt about the 
reality of her fear for her life." (R. 135 at 4, 6); State v. 
Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83. 
Unlike Sweeney, the Court of Appeals in this case did not make 
a credibility determination in conflict with the trial court. 
Instead, the Court of Appeals utilized and applied the appropriate 
standard of review for a bench trial and concluded that the trial 
court's verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. 
State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83. In fact, even the 
dissent acknowledged that the majority used the appropriate test, 
but it simply disagreed with the majority's assessment of the 
weight of the evidence. State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
84. In doing so, however, the dissent, not the majority, 
erroneously referred to the testimony of Don McCord in which he 
claimed that Mrs. Strieby threatened the decedent. The District 
Court never referred to this thoroughly discredited testimony in 
reaching its verdict and, in fact, expressly credited Mrs. 
Strieby's testimony of events which was inconsistent with McCord's. 
Accordingly, this case presents nothing more than the State's 
disagreement with the Court of Appeals' considered judgment that 
the trial court's verdict was against the clear weight of the 
evidence and that a mistake had been made. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THE CASE. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 
standard of review for a verdict rendered in a bench trial. As 
already noted, the Court of Appeals credited the District Court's 
findings on credibility, but found that the District Court's guilty 
verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and that 
the State had failed to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83. 
As the Court of Appeals noted, the standard of review to be 
applied following a bench trial is more probing and less deferen-
tial than that applied following a jury trial. State v. Strieby, 
131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 82. The Court of Appeals relied upon State 
v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988) in support of its position. 
In Goodman, this Court noted: 
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficien-
cy of the evidence, we must sustain the trial 
court's judgment unless it is "against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." ... [T]his standard accords "appro-
priate recognition of the relative deference 
owed multi-member panels as opposed to single-
judge findings." Under this less deferential 
standard, the likelihood that a defendant's 
conviction will be reversed following a bench 
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trial, as opposed to a jury trial, is in-
creased.... [T]his standard requires that the 
clear weight of the evidence presented at 
trial not be contrary to the verdict.... Even 
if the clear weight of the evidence supports 
the verdict, however, this Court will reverse 
if it otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, thus 
providing the defendant an additional oppor-
tunity to obtain a reversal.... In reviewing a 
bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, 
we require that the weight of the evidence, 
discounting questions of credibility and 
demeanor, not oppose the verdict. Hence, a 
defendant's conviction must still be based on 
evidence establishing guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, but, on appeal, the standard of 
review aids the defendant in his efforts to 
obtain a reversal.... 
Id. at 786-87 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court of 
Appeals found that the trial court's verdict was against the clear 
weight of the evidence and that the State had failed to carry its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Strieby did 
not act in self-defense. State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
83; See State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985). 
At trial, notwithstanding clear and overwhelming evidence 
which established that at least a reasonable doubt existed re-
garding whether Mrs. Strieby acted in self-defense, the District 
Court erroneously concluded that Mrs. Strieby's shooting of the 
decedent was not legally justifiable. In delivering its verdict, 
the District Court hypothesized that the decedent — in the midst 
of his violent and ruthless attack on Mrs. Strieby — stopped and 
-15-
"went into the kitchen and poured himself a drink,n and that, with 
drink in hand, he then followed Mrs. Strieby upstairs. (R. 135 at 
8). According to the trial court, when the decedent theoretically 
paused long enough to fix a drink in the kitchen, there was a 
"reasonable, substantial cessation" in the attack on Mrs. Strieby. 
(R. 135 at 8). This conclusion by the District Court is not 
supported by a scintilla of evidence. Indeed, there was absolutely 
no evidence that the decedent fixed himself a drink during the heat 
of the assault on his wife. 
Nevertheless, in order to reach its verdict and explain the 
presence of a blue cup and wet spot on the stairs, the trial court 
inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that it was logical for the 
decedent, in the midst of brutally attacking his wife, to stop and 
fix a drink in the kitchen. As the Court of Appeals found, the 
trial court took a speculative leap across a major gap in the 
evidence. State v. Strieby, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 83. See State 
v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Although not 
necessary for the Court of Appeals' decision, and while Mrs. 
Strieby had no burden whatsoever on this issue, a more logical and 
probable explanation is that the decedent brought a partially 
filled cup of liquor with him from the shop where he had been 
drinking heavily all day and that it fell from his hand at some 
point during the attack on his wife on the stairs. Certainly, at 
least a doubt must exist on this issue. 
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More importantly, the Court of Appeals was free to reject the 
trial court's conclusion on this point, as the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court did in Commonwealth v. Helm, 402 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1979), a case 
remarkably similar to the present one. In Helm, the appellant, 
charged with the murder of her boyfriend, was found guilty in a 
bench trial of manslaughter. The prosecution's evidence of the 
event largely consisted of the appellant's statement, ^d. at 502. 
As was the case here, the trial court in Helm accepted the appel-
lant's version but found that her fear was not reasonable. I<5. at 
503. Thus, the issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient 
evidence to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifi-
cally, appellant contended that she should have been acquitted 
because the evidence raised the self-defense issue which the prose-
cution failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 503. 
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court squarely rejected the trial court's conclusion that 
appellant's fear was not reasonable. Id. at 504. In a portion of 
its ruling which is directly on point here, the Supreme Court 
noted: 
The trial court's conclusion that appellant 
"could not have believed ... that it was 
necessary to kill in order to save herself 
from death or great bodily harm," is not a 
finding of fact of the kind that must be 
accepted by an appellate court. Although that 
conclusion may be considered a factual one, it 
is a conclusion which requires that certain 
inferences first be drawn from the basic 
facts. An appellate court is free to reject 
such factual conclusions when they are not 
sustained by the underlying facts.... 
-17-
Id, at 504 (citations omitted). In Helm, the Court held that the 
unarmed decedent's provocation was enough to cause a reasonable 
belief by appellant that she was in danger of serious bodily harm 
or death, noting that "[alt no time did appellant state that she 
did not think herself in danger of serious bodily injury or death 
from Harvey's unprovoked attack on her." Ld. at 504. 
The present case is more compelling for an acquittal than was 
Helm. Here, Mrs. Strieby testified, and Dr. Anderson confirmed, 
that as a result of being knocked down and dragged down the stairs 
on her back and head, she suffered actual severe bodily injury and 
was in danger of death given her broken back and four prior back 
surgeries. Indeed, Dr. Anderson said that Mrs. Strieby suffered 
severe bodily injury in the form of a ruptured cervical disk as a 
result of the decedent's attack. (R. 137 at 203). 
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals found, the clear weight of 
the evidence demonstrated that the decedent vigorously pursued 
respondent up the steps and repeatedly threatened to kill her as he 
approached her on the steps. The State argues that Mrs. Strieby1s 
testimony that she pushed the decedent and he went into the kitchen 
supports the trial court's inference regarding a reasonable and 
substantial cessation in hostilities. However, this illogicial 
inference hardly evidences any cessation in hostilities much less a 
reasonable and substantial cessation in the decedent's attack 
especially given the fact that the entire incident took place in a 
few minutes and the decedent, in his irrational and drunken state, 
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never stopped yelling at Mrs. Strieby and continued the attack by 
coming up the stairs and screaming at Mrs. Strieby that he was 
going to kill her. (R. 137 at 245-246). Indeed, as the Court of 
Appeals held: 
All the evidence other than the blue cup in-
dicates that defendant reasonably believed 
herself to be in imminent danger of serious 
injury or death and that she had, indeed, 
already suffered serious injury. The trial 
court did not doubt her credibility, but never-
theless engaged in pure speculation about a 
cessation of hostilities. While the trial 
court's conclusions should be respected, the 
conviction may not oppose the weight of the 
evidence. Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. We find 
the court's guilty verdict contrary to the 
clear weight of the evidence and, as a result, 
that the State failed to prove the elements of 
manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court of Appeals' decision was correct in every respect in 
concluding, after careful consideration of the record, that the 
trial judge's finding of guilty was against the clear weight of the 
evidence in the face of overwhelming evidence of self-defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully requests that 
this Court deny the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^M*** day of May, 1990. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Neil A. Kaplan 
Anneli R. Smith 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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APPENDIX 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(a) Ef feet. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law there-
on, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It 
will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court. The trial 
court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, 
except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than 
one ground. 
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